The 6th Division Strikes North
The 6th Division's first
plans for the capture of Wawa Dam called for the 1st and 20th Infantry
Regiments to drive northward abreast, the 1st Infantry on the east.3 With its right on the Bosoboso River, the
1st Infantry was to strike north across a front a mile and a half wide. (Map 16) The terrain in the regiment's zone was
dominated by a partially wooded, steep-sided ridge line running north-northwest
from Mt. Baytangan, the regiment's line of departure. The first section of the
ridge north of Mt. Baytangan the 1st Infantry soon dubbed Woodpecker Ridge
after the large number and constant chatter of Japanese machine guns that
characterized the defenses. The regiment hoped it could quickly clear
Woodpecker Ridge as far as dominating ground just southwest of the
Bosoboso-Marikina confluence, ground that also controlled the upper reaches of
the Mango River in the 20th Infantry's zone.
The 20th Infantry's
first major objective was Mt. Mataba. Part of the regiment was to strike toward
this objective along a 1,000-foot-high bare ridge leading west-northwest from
Mt. Baytangan. The ridge gave way to an open-sloped north-south ridge line, the
northern end of which lay a mile east of Mt. Mataba's crest and joined that crest
across a saddle over 750 feet high. As of 28 March, when the 6th Division's new
attack was to start, the 20th Infantry already had one infantry company on the
north-south ridge at a knob a mile and a half southeast of Mataba's peak.
The 63d Infantry would
support the 20th Infantry by executing diversionary attacks along the western
slopes of Mt. Mataba. General Hurdis, the 6th Division commander, hoped that
the attacks would force the Kobayashi Force to disclose the
location of machine gun, mortar, and artillery emplacements, thereby permitting
the division's supporting aircraft and artillery to deliver timely and accurate
fire for the 20th Infantry. The 6th Reconnaissance Troop, for similar purposes,
would probe east across the Bosoboso River toward Mt. Purro, which overlooked
all the 1st Infantry's zone.
Intense small arms,
machine gun, and mortar fire, occasionally augmented by accurate harassing
artillery bombardments, characterized the resistance the 1st and 20th Infantry
Regiments encountered during the week beginning 28 March.4 Operations seesawed back and forth as the
American units gave ground that proved untenable, but then attacked to regain
the same ground. At the end of the week Japanese resistance seemed stronger
than when the attack began. The 20th Infantry had moved less than half a mile
toward Mt. Mataba, and the 1st Infantry had secured hardly 250 yards of ground
in a northerly direction. Both regiments were becoming bogged down.
General Hurdis had hoped
his attack, directed against the Kobayashi Force southern
flank, would be far more successful, but the Kobayashi Force, rapidly
and efficiently, had reoriented its defenses, which it had laid out primarily
to face an attack from the west.5 The force's two remaining provisional
infantry regiments, the Central and Right Sector
Units, were still relatively intact, and the Central Sector
Unit, bearing the brunt of the 6th Division's offensive, had recently
been reinforced by remnants of the Left Sector Unit and
elements of the Shimbu Group Reserve.
Other factors bearing on
the 6th Division's slow progress were the declining strength and deteriorating
combat efficiency of its infantry regiments. The 20th Infantry could muster
only 2,085 effectives on 3 April; some of its rifle companies were reduced to
the combat strength of platoons. The situation within the 1st Infantry, with an
effective strength of 2,150, was little better. As of 3 April the commanders of
both regiments rated their units' combat efficiency only as "fair,"
the lowest ranking of three terms each had employed since the Lingayen Gulf
assault.6
The XI Corps and the 6th
Division would have to make some changes if the division were to continue the
offensive, and during the period 3-5 April, Generals Hall and Hurdis effected
some of the most necessary ones. First, General Hall reduced the 6th Division's
front, organizing a provisional brigade composed of the 112th Cavalry RCT and
the 169th RCT, 43d Division, to take over the area north of an east-west line
across Mt. Oro, a line that corresponded closely to the boundary between the Kobayashi and Kawashima
Forces. Hall placed the brigade under the command of Brig. Gen. Julian
W. Cunningham and designated the provisional unit Baldy Force.7 Cunningham's commands were almost always
"cursed" with this name, for the general, like Friar Tuck, had just a
fringe of hair around his pate.
The change of boundaries
on the north released the bulk of the 63d Infantry for General Hurdis' use in a
new attack against the Kobayashi Force. The 63d Infantry had
about 2,425 relatively fresh combat effectives as of 3 April and was ready for
a good scrap. Hurdis directed the unit to relieve the 20th Infantry and
continue the attack north toward Mt. Mataba. For the time being the 1st
Infantry would hold the little ground it had gained along Woodpecker Ridge and
confine its activities to patrolling.8
From 6 through 9 April
the 63d Infantry made only limited advances and on the 10th switched the
emphasis of its attack to a drive up the western slopes of Mt. Mataba. Over a
month earlier the 1st Infantry had failed in an attempt to take Mt. Mataba from
the west, but now the 63d Infantry, moving forward behind a heavy artillery
preparation, found the mountain's bare western slopes weakly defended. On 10
April the regiment secured the southwestern quarter of the mountain, but then
discovered that the Kobayashi Force still retained a remarkable
degree of maneuverability. Having pulled many troops out of its western
defenses to meet the attack from the south, the Kobayashi Force quickly
transferred strength back to Mt. Mataba from the north-south ridge. The
Japanese did not have sufficient strength to hold both terrain features for
long, but they were able to keep the 63d Infantry off Mt. Mataba's crest until
17 April.
The 63d Infantry's
success at Mt. Mataba on the 17th was accompanied by a renewed 1st Infantry
effort to drive north along Woodpecker Ridge. The effort failed, and by the end
of the day it became evident that until supporting artillery and aircraft could
reduce many more defenses in the 1st Infantry's zone the regiment could gain
ground along Woodpecker Ridge only at the risk of prohibitive casualties. For
the second time in two weeks General Hurdis ordered the 1st Infantry to halt.
Hurdis hoped to move
immediately against Mt. Pacawagan and Wawa Dam, but he again faced personnel
problems. As of 17 April the 1st Infantry's effective strength was 2,190; the
63d Infantry had less than 2,335 effectives; and the 20th Infantry, built back
up to a strength of 2,485 effectives, still needed rest. The rifle companies of
the 1st Infantry averaged only 105 effectives apiece, the 20th Infantry's were
at 125, and the 63d's companies could muster less than 120 effectives each.9
The problem was solved in somewhat the same fashion that it had
been on 3 April. The 145th Infantry of the 37th Division came out of Manila,
and the 20th Infantry of the 6th Division went into the city to take up
garrison duties. Out of combat for over a month, the
145th Infantry had an
effective strength of 3,000 troops and, rested, was ready to strike into the
mountains against the Shimbu Group. General Hurdis directed
the regiment to move on Mt. Pacawagan from the west; he ordered the 63d
Infantry to provide the new arrivals with fire support from Mt. Mataba; and he
instructed the 1st Infantry to hold and patrol pending the outcome of the 145th
Infantry's attack. The latter was to have the following support:10
Division and Corps
Artillery
3 105-mm. howitzer battalions
2 155-mm. howitzer battalions
1 155-mm. gun battery
1 240-mm. howitzer battery
1 8-inch howitzer battery
2 90-mm. AAA gun batteries
From the 63d RCT on Mt.
Mataba
5 M7 105-mm. SPM howitzers of Cannon Company
8 81-mm. mortars
8 4.2-inch mortars
2 57-mm. AT guns
11 .50-caliber machine guns
12 .30-caliber heavy machine guns
The support fires almost
pulverized Japanese defenses on the western and southern slopes of Mt.
Pacawagan, yet the 145th Infantry, starting its attack on 21 April, could not
secure a hold on much of the mountain until the 30th. Even then, the Kobayashi
Force maintained positions on the extreme northeastern peak and on a
spur hill about three-quarters of a mile south-southeast of the northeastern
crest. The gains through 30 April had cost the 145th Infantry 55 men killed and
220 wounded--in nine days the regiment had incurred more casualties than had
any regiment of the 6th Division for the entire month of April.
During the 145th Infantry's attack the 1st and 63d Infantry
Regiments had continued to hold the ground they already occupied until relieved
late in the month by the 151st and 152d Infantry Regiments of the 38th
Division. On 30 April responsibility for further offensives against the Kobayashi
Force and toward Wawa Dam passed from the 6th to the 38th Division.11
Having virtually
destroyed the Kobayashi Force's Left Sector Unit by the end of
March, the 6th Division and its attachments had made significant strides during
April toward the elimination of the Central and Right
Sector Units. In fact, the Japanese unit designations had apparently
lost meaning by the end of April and Headquarters, Kobayashi Force, had
taken over direct control of defensive operations in front of Wawa Dam. That
Japanese force had lost about 3,000 men killed from 28 March through 30 April,
and had given up important defensive terrain.
6th Infantry Division (Charlie-63) – Mount
Mataba – Luzon – April 6-17 1945
The 6th Infantry Division, less the 63rd Infantry Regiment, landed
with the assault echelon of 1 Corps and participated in the drive for Manila by
furnishing protection for the left flank of the 6-A. The 63-IR, was initially
in Corps reserve. The Division destroyed enemy resistance encountered in the
Cabaruan Hills; defeated elements of the Japanese 2nd Armored Division at
Munoz; seized and secured the high ground south of San Jose; cut the island of
Luzon in half by seizure of Baler Bay and Dingalan Bay on the east coast.
During the period Feb 24 1945 – Apr 19 1945, the 6-ID was engaged in operations
against the Shimbu Line, east of Manila.
The General Situation
On March 15, the XI
Corps relieved the the XIV Corps in operations against the Shimbu Line. At this
time the VI Corps was composed of the 6th Infantry Division, the 43rd Infantry
Division and the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team. The 6-ID, in the center
of the Corps zone, was ordered to attack against the Montalban sector of the
Shimbu Line. The 6-ID’s plan of attack was simple. The 1-IR and the 20-IR were
used to spearhead the advance and attack on Mount Mataba and Mount Baytangan
from the southeast, while the 63-IR protected the left flank of the Division.
The Shimbu Line, located east of Manila in the Sierra Mountains, extended from
Ipo Dam in the north to Antipolo in the south. The enemy had his forces
generally concentrated in five sectors :
– Antipolo
– Marikina
– Central (Mount Baytangan)
– Montalban
– Ipo Dam
An estimated 17,000
troops occupied the Shimbu Line. The Montalban sector, located generally in the
center, consisted of Mount Oro (1,000 feet), Mount Pacawagan (1500 feet), and
Mount Mataba (1,400 feet). Mount Mataba dominated the Marikina River Valley.
Its main ridge ran generally north and south with three prominent peaks, Knob 1
on the southern tip, Red Top in the center and Knob 2 on the northern tip. The
western approaches to Mount Mataba consisted of steep hog back ridges with deep
ravines covered by a dense growth of vegetation and trees. Elements of the
Japanese 8th and 105th Divisions, 26th Independent Mixed Brigade and
miscellaneous service units were located in this area. They had spent months in
preparing positions in this sector, consisting of an elaborate network of
mutually supporting caves with connecting underground tunnels covering all
avenues of approach leading to Mount Mataba.
The men of the 6th Division were considered in the category of
seasoned troops. In addition to their operations on Luzon, they had experienced
considerable combat in New Guinea. Replacements were quick to acquire the
fighting spirit of the unit because of its high esprit de corps. Morale was
excellent. At this time logistical support was adequate. On the other hand, the
enemy had suffered reverses and was occupying defensive positions,
nevertheless, his morale was assumed to be excellent. Captured documents
indicated that his supplies were sufficient, in that he had placed a six months
stockpile of supplies in this area. Taking everything into consideration the
combat efficiency of the opposing forces was considered equal.
Disposition and Plans of the 63rd Infantry
Regiment
From Mar 15 to Apr 5 the
63rd Infantry had protected the left flank of the Division extending from the
vicinity of Ipo Dam in the north to San Mateo in the south. During the period
of Apr 6-9, the 63rd Infantry attacked Mount Mataba with two battalions, the
2nd and 3rd, to seize objectives A, B and X from the southwest but was repulsed
with heavy losses.
On Apr 10, the regiment
planned to attack with all three battalions to seize objectives A, B, X and 0.
The 1st Bn was to make a surprise attack from the west, under concealment of
darkness, to seize and hold objective G (Mount Mataba). The 2nd Bn was to seize
objective X from the south while the 3rd Bn was directed to capture objectives
A and B.
Disposition and Plans of 1st Bn, 63-IR
The battalion planned to
attack Mount Mataba from the west at 0400, Apr 10, with two companies abreast,
A Co and C Co. C on the right; would attack up Ridge R while A would attack up
Ridge S. B Co, in reserve, would protect the routes of supply and evacuation.
Each assault company was reinforced with one section of machine guns from D Co.
The 81 MM mortars were to be placed in general support from positions west of
San Mateo. For this operation one platoon of tanks and one platoon of 4.2
mortars were attached to the battalion.
The Company Situation
G Co had occupied a
portion of the battalion defensive position, southwest from Novaliches Water
Shed, along the pipe line which supplied the water for Manila. Daily patrols
had been dispatched to the east to reconnoiter the area around Ho Name Gorge
and other ravines in the vicinity of Mount Mataba in an effort to determine
routes of advance, enemy strength and dispositions. These patrols reported that
all ravines were thickly wooded and covered with a dense growth of underbrush
providing excellent concealment for enemy installations. They further reported
that the area was void of any trails except for a few narrow foot paths. It was
known that the enemy had constructed an elaborate system of mutually supporting
caves and foxholes, connected by underground tunnels. These positions were
located on the commanding ground covering all approaches to Mount Mataba. These
approaches crossed flat rice paddies in the Mariquina River Valley and were
subject to constant hostile observation.
The strength of C Co
just prior to the jump off was 90 enlisted men and 2 officers, (the company
commander and the 1st platoon leader) of this strength approximately one fifth
were replacements who had been received in the past month. They had been given
as complete an orientation and indoctrination into combat as possible by being
utilized to the fullest on combat and reconnaissance patrols and in setting up
ambushes. The composition of all patrols was carefully supervised to ensure
that each patrol had a proportionate share of combat veterans and was commanded
by a reliable non-commissioned officer. While the company had been guarding the
pipe line they received a well earned rest, which, in conjunction with three
hot meals daily, had raised morale to a new high. The combat efficiency of the
company was considered to be excellent.
Captured documents
indicated that the enemy was determined to make the seizure of Mount Mataba a
costly as well as a timely operation. The Japs were prepared to defend each
position at all costs which might easily tend to dissipate the strength of the
main attack to several separate individual operations in the reduction of these
defensive positions. Throughout this period the weather was hot and humid with
excellent visibility during the day. With the exception of a shower on Apr 14
the weather was clear.
The Company Plan of Attack
The company planned to
attack in a column of platoons, the men in single file. The 1st Platoon, with D
Co’s machine gun section attached, would lead the attack up the razor back
ridge to seize and hold Mount Mataba. The forward command group was to follow
behind this platoon. The 2nd Platoon, with the company’s light machine guns
attached, would be in support. This platoon would furnish flank protection by
fire and would follow behind – the forward command group. The remainder of the
command group followed the 2nd Platoon. The 3rd Platoon, also in support,
following the rear command group, was to protect the rear of the company and
assist in the evacuation of casualties. The artillery forward observer and his
party was placed with the forward command group, while the 81 MM mortar
observer accompanied the 1st Platoon. No 60 MM mortar observers were to be used
from the mortar section, but would be employed to carry extra ammunition as a
resupply problem was anticipated. Platoon leaders and key non commissioned
officers were to adjust their own 60 MM mortar fire. Communication would
consist of SCR 526 radios within the company command net and one SCR 300 radio
in the battalion command net. The company was instructed that the battalion
communication officer would lay wire from battalion to the company area of
departure. At this point the company would be responsible for continuing this
line as the unit advanced.
No line of departure was
to be used but rather an area of departure. The platoon leaders were informed
that trucks would be spotted in the vicinity of the rear assembly area at 2330,
Apr 9, to move the company to the area of departure. The company would remain
in the latter area only long enough to detruck, assume the designated formation
and move out. The attack was scheduled for 0400 Apr 10, approximately one hour
before daylight. The element of surprise was stressed; supporting fires were
planned, but would not be delivered except on call of the company.
Final Preparations for the Attack and Movement
to the Area of Departure
Since a minimum amount
of time would be spent in the area of departure, platoon leaders were
instructed that blankets and extra equipment would be stacked in platoon piles
in the rear assembly area. One bandoleer of ammunition and two combat type K
rations were issued to each man. Squad leaders were ordered to make last minute
checks to ensure that each man had his poncho, extra pair of socks, and two
full canteens of water. All men were briefed on the necessity of maintaining
strict light discipline and in keeping noise to the minimum. Coffee and hot
sandwiches were served at 2300/0000. The company departed from the rear
assembly area at 0100, Apr 10, and arrived at the area of departure at 0200.
The men detrucked, formed quickly, and moved out promptly at 0215.
Narration : Attack on
the Shimbu Line – (Mount Mataba)
C Co left the area of departure in single file at 0215 Apr 10, in a column of
platoons, according to plan. A four man patrol preceded the company by one
hundred yards with the mission of furnishing early warning of any enemy
activity to the front. This patrol had communications with the company by means
of an SCR 536 radio. The men selected for this patrol had previously been over
this ground on reconnaissance missions looking for the best route of approach
to Mataba. The movement from the area of departure to the base of Mount Mataba
was made over a well defined trail and presented no particular problem of
control.
At 0330, the company
reached the base of Mataba, and continued in a northerly direction toward Ridge
R, the company route of approach to the top of Mataba. Without warning, and
sending chills down the spine of every man in the company, the silence of the
night was broken by the ferocious barking of several dogs, terminating in a
sharp whine and a brief order in a foreign tongue. The column halted but no
further sound was heard. Several thoughts passed through the mind of the
company commander at this time.
Had the element of
surprise, as essential to the successful accomplishment of the mission, been
lost ?
Was this an outpost of the, enemy, a series of listening posts, employing dogs
?
If it was an outpost, would it call for mortar and artillery fire ?
Did the enemy know the true size of the unit or possibly think that it was only
a patrol ?
After several minutes
had elapsed without further incident, the column continued in the direction of
Ridge B. At 0245, the security patrol reported that enemy movement could be
heard approaching from the north. The 1st Platoon was deployed to the left and
right, while the security group was ordered to remain in their present position
and to keep the company commander informed of the situation. From the excited
reports that poured in from this group a force of considerable size was
approaching. Meanwhile, the company commander had moved forward to join the 1st
Platoon, where machine guns on each flank had been set up, ready to commence
firing on order of the platoon leader. At 0355 the security group reported that
the suspected enemy force was A Co.
The two company
commanders held a conference and decided that they had overshot their
respective ridges. They felt they were located somewhere between Ridges R and
3. It was decided that the companies would reverse their respective routes and
use the first ridges they came to as their routes to Mataba. While A Co was
withdrawing, excited voices, jabbering in Japanese, could be heard a short
distance away. The 1st Platoon Sergeant and four men were sent to investigate
the noise. They encountered a large cave from which the noises were plainly
audible. White Phosphorous hand grenades (M-15) thrown into this cave resulted
in cries of pain. One Jap, who ran out of the entrance, was quickly killed by a
rifleman. No further sounds could be heard. A squad was left in the vicinity of
the cave to furnish security as the company passed this location.
At 0420, the 1st Platoon
Leader reported that he was at the base of Ridge K and he was ordered to
advance up the ridge. Due to the narrowness of this ridge, the column remained
in single file. By daylight, all elements of the company, with the exception of
the 60 MM Mortar Section, were advancing. At 0830, the company received sniper
fire from Ridge Q, approximately four hundred yards to the south. The men were
forced to hug the ground, taking advantage of any cover and concealment they
could find. The fire was finally located coming from a cave on the forward
slope of Ridge Q. Small arms and machine gun fire was directed into this cave,
resulting in one Jap being flushed out. He ran over the ridge and disappeared
from sight. A check of the company revealed that three men had been wounded,
including the company commander’s messenger and radio operator. One of the
casualties could not walk and four men from the 3rd Platoon were used to
evacuate this man on a litter.
Meanwhile, smoke was
placed along Ridge Q and denied the enemy farther observation from this direction.
At 0945, the company had advanced approximately two hundred yards forward when
the company commander noticed for the first time that the remaining elements of
the company were not following. The company commander turned to retrace, his
route, but in so doing, twisted his ankle, lost his balance, and went head over
heels down the north aide of the ridge.
Approximately three quarters of the way down he stopped his descent in the
midst of dense vegetation and amid the excited babbling of enemy voices. Without
a lost motion he unhooked his cartridge belt and began scrambling up the aide
of the ridge with tiny puffs of dust kicking up all about him. He succeeded in
reaching the top only to look into the muzzle of an M-1 rifle held by one of
his men. In fact, this was the same man who had failed to see the column move
out and consequently held up the balance of the command.
A radio message was
received at this time from the 1st Platoon Leader reporting their location at
Point W, approximately one hundred and fifty yards from the top of the main
ridge running north and south. From there he had observed thirty six Japs
moving south along the ridge line. The company commander moved forward without
delay and joined the platoon leader. At 1045, they observed small groups of
Japs moving to the south. This area, approximately one hundred fifty yards
northeast from Point W, appeared to be covered with foxholes. A ten minute
artillery preparation of high explosive was placed on these positions. Since
the wind was blowing from the north it was decided to end the concentration
with smoke, which, drifting south, would obscure any enemy visibility from that
direction. At 1100, just as the artillery preparation finished, the 1st Platoon
jumped off and succeeded in reaching this area without opposition.
The 1st Platoon was
ordered to hold this position and to protect the right (south) flank of the
company as it turned left (north) and advanced to the north along the main
ridge. The 1st Platoon was instructed that it would protect the rear of the
company after all elements of the company had passed. The 2nd Platoon was
directed to pass around the left flank of the 1st Platoon, turn north and
advance along the main ridge. The command group followed the 3rd Platoon and
the remainder of the formation remained unchanged. The 60 MM Mortar Section had
joined the column and had gone into position to support the advance of the
company. Meanwhile, the 1st Platoon had sent six men down the ridge to the
south to secure the company’s right flank and rear. One of these men observed a
patch of grass almost at his feet which seemed to rise out of the ground. He
fired into it and was rewarded with a cry of pain. He discovered a very
cleverly constructed foxhole. It appeared to be a normal foxhole, four feet
deep and two feet in circumference, with a cover constructed for the top. This
cover consisted of a network of interwoven branches covered with a topping of
sod which blended in perfect harmony with the terrain, affording excellent
concealment for the hole as well as the occupant. Apparently the enemy planned
on hitting the rear of the column as it moved north along the main ridge. The
mere fact that this particular Jap had become over anxious and was lifting his
cover to observe the column led to his timely death. Two other similar holes,
occupied by the enemy, were found and their occupants liquidated.
At 1200, the 2nd Platoon
leader reported that he was maneuvering around a cave, east of the main ridge,
where he had observed a Jap disappear. The company commander ordered him to
send a security party forward along the ridge. By 1215, the resistance in the
cave had been eliminated primarily by use of white phosphorous grenades which
had killed an undetermined number of Japs. At 1245, the 2nd Platoon reported
that they had reached a small knoll approximately two hundred yards south of
Knob 1. The company commander joined the platoon leader at this point. A number
of the enemy was observed moving westward in small groups. Artillery fire
dispersed these groups and inflicted an unknown number of casualties. Part of A
Co, on the left of C Co, was observed in a grenade battle with four enemy on
Knob 1, which terminated when a white phosphorous grenade landed in the crater
hole occupied by the Japs. Two of the enemy were killed by small arms fire when
they left the crater hole in an effort to escape the effects of the grenade.
Meanwhile, C Co’s
machine guns had gone into position and began firing on small groups of enemy
attempting to infiltrate across open ground to Knob 1. These groups dispersed
arid retreated toward the north. No further resistance was encountered and, at
1315, the battalion commander was informed by radio that Knob 1 was secured. He
ordered C Co and A Co to form a perimeter defense around Knob 1 and to dispatch
reconnaissance patrols towards the north. C Co organized the north portion of
the perimeter.
Meanwhile, a patrol of
seven men from the 3rd Platoon had approached Red Top from the south. Several
Japs were seen by the patrol moving toward the north along the main ridge. No
resistance was offered, with the exception of harassing sniper fire from the
front and flanks, and the patrol succeeded in reaching Red Top at 1600. The
remainder of the platoon was ordered to join the patrol immediately and
instructed to form a perimeter for the night. Artillery and mortar fire was
adjusted around Knob 1 and Red Top Hill for the inevitable counterattack was
expected.
At 1730, the company,
minus, occupied the northern portion of the perimeter on Knob 1, while the 3rd
Platoon dug in on Red Top Hill. At 1800, the company was notified by phone that
an attempt to resupply the company by carrying party had failed due to enemy
artillery and mortar fire, but a liaison plane would drop supplies the following
morning at 0900. The company should be prepared, on call, to mark the drop area
with a smoke grenade. Fortunately, the men still carried two combat type K
rations and sufficient rifle and machine gun ammunition. Shortages existed in
hand grenades, especially white phosphorous, and water. At this time C Co had
approximately fifty men on Mount Mataba. In addition to the men who were
wounded and who had acted as litter bearers, a number of men suffered from heat
exhaustion because of the strenuous climb up the slopes of Ridge R, and were
forced to fall to the rear. Among these men were the 1st Sergeant and
Communication Sergeant. A radio message informed the company commander that
these stragglers had been collected at the base of Ridge R by the 1st Sergeant.
They would occupy positions in B Co’s perimeter for the night and would lead
the carrying party forward the following day.
Shortly after dark the
wire line to battalion went out and arrangements were made to make reports, on
the even hours, by SCR 500 radio. C Co’s radio would be off the air between
reports to conserve batteries while the battalion set would remain open in case
of an emergency message. Although artillery and mortar fire was received on the
position, the expected enemy counterattack failed to materialize.
The Second Day on Mount
Mataba
The second day on Mount
Mataba was spent improving the company’s defensive positions on the northern
portion of the perimeter. Reconnaissance patrols were sent north along the main
ridge toward Knob 2, but withdrew after receiving small arms and mortar fire
from this vicinity. At 0915, the liaison plane dropped supplies, including
water, rations, ammunition and blood plasma. Late in the morning, the battalion
commander directed the company to endeavor to locate the enemy mortars that
were firing on the 4.2 mortar positions. At 1125, artillery and mortar fire was
received on the company’s positions. All attempts to locate these positions met
with negative results. Meanwhile, information was received that the battalion
supply train was hit by 90 MM mortar fire and that one Filipino carrier was
killed and five wounded. It was reported that the enemy mortars were firing
from Mango Gorge. This supply train was carrying food, water, ammunition and
blood plasma. It became quite evident that the Japs were endeavoring to atop
carrying parties by artillery and mortar fire in an effort to reduce the
efficiency of the troops on Mataba.
At 1800, three men were
wounded on Knob 1 by enemy mortar fire from the vicinity of Mango Gorge. It
became increasingly apparent that observation must be obtained on the Gorge in
an effort to locate the source of this mortar fire. As darkness descended the
company withdrew all security elements and all men occupied positions on the
perimeter. This perimeter consisted of a number of mutually supporting
positions around the entire Knob. Each position was manned by three men in
individual foxholes. In this way one man would be on the alert, while the
remaining two were able to rest. At 2100, the battalion commander notified C Co
to continue the attack to the north to seize and hold Knob 2. The following day
it was believed that this knob was being used by the Japs to place observed
fire on the battalion supply train and the 4.2 mortar positions, as well as
other battalion installations in the Mariquina River Valley.
Because of the narrow
hog back ridge the approach to Knob 2 was canalized and limited the formation
to a column in single file. The strength of the enemy on this knob was unknown
but patrol reports indicated that he had automatic weapons positions on the
dominating ground covering the only approach to his position. The dense
vegetation afforded the enemy excellent concealment which, in conjunction with
his ability to camouflage his positions, made it extremely difficult to locate
them. The company planned to attack in single file with the 2nd Platoon in the
assault closely followed by the command group and the 1st Platoon. As the
distance from Red Top to Knob 2 was approximately four hundred yards the 3rd
Platoon in support was ordered to remain in position and to take under fire any
targets of opportunity that might arise. They were ordered specifically to
observe for automatic weapons fire from Ridge T.
The company’s machine
gun section was attached to the 2nd Platoon, while the 60 MM Mortar Section
would support the attack from their primary position on Knob 1. They were to be
prepared to displace forward to Knob 2 on order. A ten minute artillery and 4.2
mortar preparation was to be placed on the objective from H-10 to H hour. H
hour was designated as 0800, 12 April.
The Third Day on Mount Mataba
The attack jumped off at
0800 as scheduled and the company advanced against relatively light sniper fire
to point V at approximately two hundred yards north of Red Top. Point V
consisted of a small rise along the ridge and as soon as the men crossed over
it they immediately were exposed to enemy observation from Knob S. The scouts
were immediately hit and the attack was stopped. Heavy mortar fire began to
fall on the column and two men were seriously wounded as a result of a tree
burst. Meanwhile, the 3rd Platoon leader reported that a light machine gun was
firing from the vicinity of Ridge T, but due to the heavy vegetation he was
unable to locate it. He further stated that he was searching this area with
machine gun fire. At 1000, following another artillery preparation, the company
attacked but was stopped again at Point V by enemy small arms and automatic
weapons fire. As a result the attack was called off and the company withdrew to
its positions, on the perimeter.
Meanwhile, it was
discovered that the 3d Platoon on Red Top had received some casualties as a result
of the heavy mortar fire. One shell had scored a direct hit on a box of white
phosphorous grenades, killing one man, and seriously burning two others. The
former had been burned to a crisp when several of the grenades had fallen into
his foxhole. The company was informed at this time that a supply road had been
built from the southeast by the engineers and was approximately three hundred
yards east of Knob 1. The casualties were to be evacuated by litter directly to
the road and from there would be further evacuated by jeep ambulance. The
company reorganized and the wounded were evacuated.
At 1535, the company
commander of C Co was informed that A Co would make the attack the following
morning to capture Knob 2. C Co would be prepared to assist A Co on the
objective if needed. Meanwhile, four rounds of 150 MM mortar fell on the supply
trail just in rear of the carrying party bringing rations, water and
ammunition. The carrying party arrived on the position at 1600, and doughnuts
and hot sandwiches were relished by the men. Because of the acute shortage,
water was rationed to the platoons according to their strength.
At 1845, enemy artillery
fell on C Co positions on Red Top, without effect. With the arrival of darkness
the men went into their holes for the night. No patrolling wag done. Instead,
everyone remained in his position on the perimeter.
At 2515, the phone line to battalion went out and shortly thereafter the
company line to the platoon on Red Top failed. The company commander was unable
to contact this platoon on the SCR 536 radio.
The Fourth and Fifth Days on Mount Mataba
On Apr 13, A Co attacked
to the north following an artillery preparation, but was stopped at Point V and
withdrew to the perimeter. B Co relieved A Co on the perimeter that afternoon
and attacked Knob 2 the following morning, but was also repulsed at Point V and
withdrew to the perimeter. During this period C Co continued patrol activities
to the east and remained in position on the perimeter. During the night of Apr
13 to 14, the wire lines to the battalion were again cut by the enemy. Supplies
were sent forward each day by vehicles over the road that had been completed to
Knob 1 from the southeast.
C Co was ordered to
attack Knob 2 at 1020, Apr 15. The artillery and 4.2 mortars would fire a
preparation on the objective from H-15 to H hour and increase their range to
fire smoke on Mount Pacawagan. A self propelled mount from Cannon Company would
be attached to the company. The company plan was as follows :
The 3rd Platoon with the self propelled mount and light machine gun section
attached would lead the assault followed by the command group and 1st Platoon
in that order.
The 2nd Platoon would relieve the 3rd Platoon on Red Top at 0800, giving the
latter sufficient time to assemble and prepare for the attack.
The company would again advance in single file.
D Co’s machine gun section remained in position on Red Top.
The mortars would support the attack from their position on Knob 1.
The attack jumped off as
scheduled, but was again stopped at Point V. The self propelled mount drew fire
as soon as it appeared and immediately withdrew when it was subjected to 150 MM
mortar fire. The officer commanding the mount refused to go forward, stating
that the mortar bursts were liable to wound his men since the top of his mount
was open and afforded no protection to the occupants. He made no comment when
informed that all the infantrymen of C Co had for protection was their skin.
At 1120, no progress had
been made; however, only three casualties had been suffered by the company. The
company commander ordered one squad to move around the left to attempt to flank
the position and the balance of the platoon to build up a base of fire from the
vicinity of Point V. The 2nd Squad of the lat Platoon disappeared on the west
side of the ridge. After proceeding approximately fifty yards by rushes from
one crater to another, the squad came under heavy machine gun fire. One man,
endeavoring to continue to advance, was critically wounded. The squad was pinned
down; not a man could expose himself without being subjected to accurate small
arms and machine gun fire. Meanwhile, the balance of the platoon had been
unable to build up a base of fire as the least movement forward resulted in a
preponderance of enemy missiles being brought to bear on Point V. The
inevitable heavy mortar fire began to fall in the area. At this time the squad
leader of the 3rd Squad, on the left aide of the ridge, contacted the company
commander by 536 radio reporting two men wounded, his position untenable, and
that he could neither advance nor withdraw. A 4.2 smoke concentration was
requested and delivered on Knob 2. The 81 MM Mortar Platoon of D Co fired smoke
adjusted by the forward observer from that company on Ridge T. The 60 MM Mortar
delivered high explosive that was adjusted by the squad leader of the 3rd Squad
to his immediate front. This fire support enabled the 1st Squad to withdraw
back to the main ridge. The squad leader informed the company commander that
Knob 2 appeared to be alive with Japs. True, he had only seen a few but the
entire knob appeared to be erupting with rifle fire. Further, he had observed
one machine gun on Ridge T firing flanking fire on Point V and another machine
gun appeared to be located in the center of Knob 2. The latter position caused
him the most trouble. Although it was less than one hundred fifty yards away he
had not been able to locate it definitely. This information was forwarded to
the battalion commander, who directed that G Co withdraw to their positions on
Knob 1. The company commander was informed that B Co would seize the objective
the following morning.
At 2300, enemy could be
heard digging to the front and artillery fire was placed on Knob 2 with
unobserved results. The digging continued during the night and speculation
arose whether the enemy had received reinforcements, way improving his
positions, or burying his dead resulting from the mortar and artillery fire.
The Sixth Day on Mount Mataba
On Apr 16, B Co
supported by mortar and artillery fire attempted to capture Knob 2 and was once
again repulsed at Point V and withdrew to its position on the southern portion
of the perimeter. Meanwhile, the regiment directed the engineers to extend the
road around Red Top to Point V to enable a tank to get to the position. C Co
was notified by the battalion commander that they would take Knob 2 the
following day. One Sherman tank would be in support of the operation and would
arrive at C Co’s position at 0800 the following morning. Information was also
received at this time that a captured enemy document, dated Apr 14, had ordered
the enemy to Intensify infiltration on Americans for next three days preceding
general counterattack.
At 1330, the battalion
commander notified G Co of the supporting fires to be furnished. Two medium
artillery battalions and one 8 Inch battery would fire a fifteen minute
preparation from H-15 to H hour. When the artillery fires lifted the 4.2 and 81
MM mortars would fire on the objective, to lift on call of C Co.
C Co’s attack order was
given to the platoon leaders at 1500. The 1st platoon, with the tank attached,
would lead the assault, followed by the command group and the 3rd Platoon, in
that order. The 2nd Platoon would remain in position on Red Top Hill, prepared
to displace on order to Knob 2 to assist in the reorganization of that
position. The 2nd Platoon was ordered to secure the attack position, just
behind Point V, at daylight. The line of departure would be Point V. At this
time the company commander sensed, for the first time, a feeling among the men
that the objective would be taken. The mere fact that a tank would support the
attack had a tremendous psychological effect on the men. The men were also
carrying extra grenades, especially white phosphorous (M-15 WP), which was
indicative of a new determination.
The Capture of Knob 2
At 0620, Apr 17, the 2nd
Platoon reported that the attack position was secured. No enemy resistance had
been encountered. At 0815, the tank joined the company behind Red Top and at
0845, the artillery and mortar preparation commenced. Under cover of this noise
the company moved out with the tank to a position one hundred yards in rear of
the attack position. Upon completion of the artillery and mortar fires, the
company moved quickly to the attack position and called for the mortar fires to
lift.
The tank moved out over
Point V with its 75 firing and machine guns spraying the area to its front. For
the first time the men could see the enemy. The preparatory fires had left the
hill practically void of any vegetation. Enemy riflemen, apparently demoralized
by the sight of the tank, fired excitedly as well as wildly. As the main ridge
widened the second squad was deployed around the left side of the tank. The
light machine guns were set up on the flanks of Point V and began to spray
Ridge T with bullets. Japs, their torsos torn practically in half, continued to
resist. One Jap, his leg blown off at the knee, manned a heavy machine gun
until struck by a .30 caliber bullet. It was a suicidal defense, but once the
attack gained momentum it bowled over the opposition. No words can express the
magnificent job accomplished by the tank. The enemy was completely surprised
and stunned by its appearance.
At 1050, battalion wag
notified that the objective had been taken. Meanwhile, the men who had been
mopping up on Knob 2 received sniper fire from Mount Pacawagan. This fire
ceased when the 4.2 mortars blinded the enemy with smoke. A large cave was
discovered on the north side of the Knob. This cave had apparently been used by
the Japs to escape the devastating effects of the artillery and mortar fires.
The entire Knob was found to consist of a series of mutually supporting
foxholes connected by underground tunnels. Tunnels in several of the holes
appeared to lead toward the large cave on the reverse slope of the Knob. White
phosphorous grenades were thrown into all such tunnels. It soon became quite
apparent why the Japs had made a last ditch stand to hold this Knob. It
afforded an excellent view of the Mango River Gorge and disclosed a number of
trails leading up to Mount Pacawagan from this direction. A few Japs were seen
occasionally moving to the east in the gorge and artillery was fired in these
areas with unobserved results.
On the final assault of
Knob 2 by G Co, two light machine guns, one heavy machine gun and a number of
enemy rifles were captured. Approximately thirty-five dead Japs were counted on
the Knob and an undetermined number were already buried. Several times the men,
digging new fox holes, would dig into enemy graves. No time was lost in
organizing a perimeter defense. Concertina wire and sand bags were used to
strengthen the position. Booby traps were constructed and placed in critical
areas to give early warning of any hostile approach. While the perimeter
defense was being organized observation posts were established. At dark all
security elements withdrew to the perimeter and prepared for an expected
counterattack that failed to materialize. The enemy was content to harass the
position with mortar and artillery fire. C Co’s casualties for the final
assault on Knob 2 were much leas than expected, in that, only one man was
killed and three men were wounded. On the other aide of the ledger, thirty-five
enemy dead were counted. An undetermined number had been killed and sealed in
the spider like net work of tunnels and in the large cave. In summary, C Co,
63rd Infantry, did accomplish its mission by assisting in the capture of Knob
1, by seizure and subsequent holding of Red Top and, in the final phase, the
capture of Knob 2 in an all out assault. The seizure of this dominant and
critical terrain feature in the heart of the Shimbu Line paved the way for the
later capture of Mount Pacawagan and the ultimate destruction of the Shimbu
Line. It denied to the enemy his most advantageous point of observation on the
Marikina River Valley and the city of Manila, farther to the west. In turn it
provided observation for the American forces down the Mango River Gorge, one of
the main communication routes of the Japs and suspected location of many of his
artillery and heavy mortar pieces.
C Co’s losses during
this operation amounted to three men killed and sixteen men wounded. Although
the actual enemy casualties are not known it far exceeded those of C Co. On
Knob 2 alone, thirty-five enemy dead were counted while an undetermined number
were destroyed in the numerous tunnels and caves. No prisoners of war were
taken. C Co, by their participation in this action, shared in a unit citation
awarded to the 1st Battalion, 63d Infantry, for outstanding performance of duty
in action against the enemy in the Shimbu line, Mount Mataba area.
Thomas on June 8, 2019 at 12:32 pm
I Corporal John L. McGee
is listed among the 63rd Infantry Regiment. Could this be the person you are
looking for?
There is a considerable
amount of records here on the website. Please take some time to look around.
You might be surprised what you discover. The entirety of the book, the 6th
Infantry Division in World War II is up on the website. I have included a link
to Mr. McGee’s name but did not find any “McKee.”
Thanks, I will look
further on the site. The trucker named August told me his mother said last name
McKee but I guess it could be McGee. It's a fragment to work with. Thanks, I
will do more research. I have hiked Mt Mataba are 2x and will do so again. I've
seen the Japanese tunnels, now collapsed. I will see foxholes and caves soon. A
friend who lives on the hill found approx 50 Japanese skeletons on the ground
surface in the early 70s. I find it hard to believe the remains were there from
1945 -1971... Unless tunnels/graves subsided. He found all manner of things.
Dozens of brass dog tags. He buried them on the hill. This battle was a total
American victory, as the war accounts state. I guess many Japanese soldier
remains are entombed in the tunnels and caves. A friend has seen Japanese teams
in the Philippines who look for lost soldiers on the hills we hike. At Mt Mataba
(wrong name), a damn rubbish dump hugs the hill. Trash eh? And it covers the
wreck of a Lockheed P-38 Lightning (I think. Need to research) brought down
napalming Japanese positions. The wreck was recycled. No news on the pilot.
John L. McGee
John L. McGee
World War II
|
Service #
|
37066030
|
|
Rank
|
Corporal, U.S. Army
|
|
Unit
|
63rd Infantry
Regiment, 6th Infantry Division
|
|
Entered Service From
|
Arkansas
|
|
Date of Death
|
June 26, 1945
|
|
Buried
|
Taguig
City, Philippines
|
Thanks for the details.
I am unsure if this is the soldier. Name can be wrong but the date of death, i
think Mt Mataba fighting was April 1945. More research is needed. Do we know
the location of Mr McGee’s death? That will help greatly. I do not think it is
Mr McKee. Down to the actual dates, Mt Mataba battle in April and June for
McGee’s death. But I cannot be sure. I gotta speak to the driver again. Thanks
for the details.
US General killed on Mt
Mataba
Twenty-six missions were flown in the Mt Mataba
area. The following report was received 11 April from the 43rd Division:
“Besides many dazed and stupefied Nips approximately two hundred more were
found dead on objective Mt. Mataba taken yesterday (10 April) which has been
struck repeatedly by planes before advance of friendly troops.
